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Harmonizing the Battle of the Forms:
A Comparison of the United States,
Canada, and the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods
ABSTRACT

As trade between the United States and Canada continues
to increase on the heels of the free trade agreements of the early
1990s, the question of which body of commercial law to apply to
these transactions becomes increasingly important. The United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG) serves as the default governing law for many of
these transactions. In spite of its lack of use and the confusion it
has brought to choice of law provisions as a self-executing
treaty, many scholars have suggested that the CISG can
continue to serve as a body of transnationalcontract law if it is
harmonized with the domestic laws of the United States and
Canada.
This Note illustratesthe existing confusion by looking at a
common contract hypothetical, the battle of the forms. It then
surveys the various arguments that have been forwarded on
behalf of harmonization and argues that international
transactionswill be ameliorated by efforts at vertical uniformity
between domestic laws and the CISG, uniform interpretationof
the CISG, and education of the practicing bar.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

III.

IV.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................
1482
THE "BATTLE OF THE FORms" PROBLEM ........................
1484
A.
The U.S. Common Law Approach......................
1485
B.
The U.S. UCC Approach.....................................
1488
C.
The CanadianApproach...................
1492
D.
The CISG Approach ............................................
1494
1500
HARMONIZING THE CISG WITH DOMESTIC LAwS .........
A.
The Need for Vertical Uniformity.......................
1500
B.
The Need for Uniform Interpretationof
the CISG ..............................................................
1504
C.
The Need for a More Educated Bar....................
1511
CONCLUSION ...................................................................
1514
1481

1482

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:1481

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has strengthened its commitment to free and
fair trade with its largest trading partner, Canada, through free trade
agreements that have been in effect for the last decade.' As a result
of this commitment, trade between the United States and Canada has
increased, rising to more than $365 billion in 1999.2 With increased
trade, however, comes an increase in private conflicts resulting from
that trade and questions of how commercial law should resolve these
transnational conflicts. 3 As the United States and other nations
contemplate a Free Trade Area of the Americas, one can expect a
proportional rise in private conflicts as trade barriers lower
4
throughout the entire Western Hemisphere.
In response to these concerns, a number of commentators have
called for a uniform commercial law to facilitate the standardization
of business practice in areas of such high-volume transactions, both
in the international arena generally and also among NAFTA trading
partners. 5 In spite of continuing efforts to produce model laws and
international restatements, 6 both the United States and Canada have
acceded to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG), which offers a solution for the

1.
United States Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19
U.S.C. § 2112 (2000); The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 296, 32 I.L.M. 605. See Michael W. Gordon, Some Observations About the
NAFTA, 7 FLA. J. INT'L L. 363 (1992) for a discussion of the promotion of free trade
through these and other agreements between the North American countries.
2.
United States Census Bureau Website, Top Ten Countries With Which the US
Trades, at http:l/www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/1999/12/balance.html [hereinafter
Top Ten Countries]. 1999 is the most recent year for which full-year census data is
available.
3.
Gordon, supra note 1, at 363-64.
4.
Anthony DePalma, Talks Tie Trade In the Americas to Democracy, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, at A6. President Bush has suggested that such a free trade area
would be an extension of NAFTA, and would be grounded in"'the cooperation between
Mexico, Canada and the United States."' Id.
5.
Boris Kozolchyk, Highways and Byways of NAFTA Commercial Law: The
Challenge To Develop a "BestPractice"in North American Free Trade, 4 U.S.-MEx. L.J.
1 (1996). For further discussion of the need for a uniform commercial law, see infra
notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
6.
A recent effort to create an international "restatement" of contract law is
known as the UNIDROIT principles. International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law, Principles of International Commercial Contracts (Rome 1994). An
example specific td NAFTA members was the 1994 Mexico City Convention that
discussed international choice of law issues. Friedrich K. Juenger, The Inter-American
Convention on the Law Applicable to InternationalContracts: Some Highlights and
Comparisons,42 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (1994).
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uniformity problem that is already in place as ratified law in both the
7
United States and Canada.
The CISG is a significant treaty because of the breadth of its
application to a wide range of international contracts.8 The CISG is
binding, by default, upon private international transactions where
each of the party's nations has ratified the treaty. 9 The CISG is
therefore the default governing body of contract law over all U.S.
trade in goods with six of its top ten trading partners.10 As one
scholar has put it, the CISG is "in effect the sales law of the North
American Free Trade Area created by the NAFTA Treaty and its
implementing legislation."'1
The ratification of the CISG in Canada and the United States
illustrates its potential as the governing commercial sale of goods law
over the myriad transactions between these nations. 12 There are,
however, a number of hurdles to its ultimate success as a uniform
trade law.' 3 One such hurdle is the need for harmonization between
the CISG and the domestic laws with which private parties in the
United States and Canada are accustomed. The potential difficulty of
this harmonization is illustrated by the classic contract formation
dispute known as the "battle of the forms." This Note will identify
the battle of the forms problem, describe domestic solutions to this

7.
The CISG was opened for signature April 11, 1980. CISG, Apr. 11, 1980, 19
I.L.M 671. The United States ratified the CISG on December 11, 1986, with the treaty
entering into force on January 1, 1988. 15 U.S.C.A. app. 332 (1998). Canada acceded
to the CISG on April 23, 1991 with the treaty entering into force on May 1, 1992.
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Website, UNCITRAL Status
of Conventions and Model Laws, at http/iwww.uncitralorg/englishistatus.pdf (showing
the dates of Canada's accession as well as the latest list of countries that have ratified
the CISG) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Status]. The text of the CISG can also be found in
JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORi LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UmITED
NATIONS CONVENTION 543-75 (3d ed. 1999).
8.
Article 1 of the CISG provides that the "Convention applies to contracts of
sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States: (a) when
the States are Contracting State. . ... " HONNOLD, supra note 7, at 29.
9.
Id. Article 6 of the CISG allows for parties to contract out of the CISG's
applicability by providing that "[t]he parties may exclude the application of this
Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions." Id. at 77.
10.
The United States' top ten trading partners are Canada, Mexico, Japan,
China, Germany, Britain, South Korea, Taiwan, France, and Singapore. Top Ten
Countries, supra note 2. Of those top ten, six-Canada, China, France, Germany,
Mexico, and Singapore-have ratified the CISG. UNCITRAL Status, supra note 7.
11.
Harry M. Fletchner, Recent Development- CISG: Another CISG Case in the
U.S. Courts: Pitfalls For the Practitioner and the Potential For Regionalized
Interpretations,15 J.L & CoM. 127, 133 (1995).
12.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
13.
For a general discussion of the many hurdles facing the CISG as a uniform
sales law, see James E. Bailey, Facingthe Truth. Seeing the Convention on Contracts
for the InternationalSale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International
Sales, 32 CORNELL INWL L.J. 273 (1999).
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problem in the United States and Canada, describe the solution to
this problem forwarded by the CISG, and analyze the challenges of
harmonizing the CISG and domestic laws.
II. THE "BATTLE OF THE FORMS" PROBLEM
The twentieth century's increase in mass production and largescale enterprise brought about the exchange of standardized form
contracts in the sale of goods. 14 The standardization of repeated
negotiations has efficiency justifications and illustrates an intent by
parties to streamline contract negotiation. 15 As an outgrowth of these
modern transactions, the "battle of the forms" arises in the contract
formation stage when a reply to an offer identifies itself as an
acceptance but contains provisions that are inconsistent with those in
the offer. 16 Transactions are negotiated as to the fundamental
elements-price, quantity, delivery, et cetera-and then the details of
the transaction are left to the forms exchanged in the negotiation
process, such as purchase orders, sales acknowledgments, and
delivery slips. Attorneys draft these forms to serve their client's
interests. 17 The details are usually contained in the boilerplateminimized typeface at the bottom or on the back of the form-and
often address limitations of liability, arbitration stipulations, and
reservations of power to cancel upon stated contingencies. 18
The "battle of the forms" dispute arises in a fairly consistent
scenario. Accordingly, this Note considers a hypothetical transaction
in order to compare the various domestic and international solutions.
The buyer, a Tennessee computer parts distributor, submits a
purchase order form to the seller, a Canadian computer parts
manufacturer, for a supply of a certain quantity and type of computer
parts at a specific price. The purchase order contains "boilerplate"
contract language in small print on the back of the order. This
boilerplate includes a clause that provides for "all disputes to be
resolved by the laws and in the courts of Tennessee." The purchase
order provides that "acceptance of this order shall be deemed to
constitute an agreement upon the part of the seller to the conditions
named hereon." The seller responds with a sales acknowledgment
form that agrees to the fundamental elements of the buyer's purchase

14.
For a discussion of the negative consequences of this standardization, see
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631-32 (1943).
15.
Id.
16.
HONNOLD, supra note 7, at 182.
17.
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 58 (3d ed. 1998).
18.
JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS 419 (7th ed. 1998).
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order-type of good, price, and quantity-with the caveat that the
agreement is "subject to the terms and conditions on the back of this
form." Those "terms and conditions" include a provision that limits
the seller's liability in the case of defects, and a second provision that
calls for disputes to be settled by arbitration in the Canadian
province of Saskatchewan.
Two situations typically develop around these "battles":
Situation #1:
The parties' agreement breaks down before
performance, and one party sues for breach of contract.
The
Tennessee distributor chooses not to perform his obligations after
forms have been exchanged. The Canadian manufacturer moves for
arbitration in Saskatchewan on a breach-of-contract theory, according
to the terms of his form.
Situation #2: The parties perform, and the agreement breaks
down subsequent to that performance. The Canadian manufacturer
sends the computer parts accompanied by his own form contract, and
the Tennessee distributor accepts shipment, but later finds the
computer parts defective and wants his money back.
The
manufacturer refuses, and the distributor sues in Tennessee state
court, according to the terms of his form. The manufacturer answers
the suit by pointing to his form, which provides for arbitration in
Canada and nevertheless limits his liability for defects.
In each of these situations, two questions must be answered. Is
there a contract? If so, what are its terms?' 9
A. The U.S. Common Law Approach
Under U.S. common law, a counter-offer operates as an implicit
rejection and terminates the offeree's power of acceptance.2 0 For an
acceptance to be valid, it must exactly correspond with the offer, a
requirement known as the "mirror image rule."2 1 A purported
acceptance that adds conditions or makes any changes to the offer is

19.
HONNOLD, supra note 7, at 182-83. Scholars have recognized that the
"battle of the forms" is oftentimes more of a contract professor's hypothetical than it is
a litigated dispute. Id. See also infra notes 160-64 and accompan)ing text This is
perhaps due to the fact that discrepancies remain unnoticed between exchanged forms
until a dispute between the parties arises. Francois Vergne, The "Bottle of the Forms"
Under the 1980 United Nations Contention on Contracts for the International Sale of

Goods, 33 A. J. COMP. L. 233 (1985). In that situation, most aggrieved parties chonse
to avoid enforcement of the contract rather than engaging in a protracted dtspute over
its terms. Id.
20.
JOHN D. CALAMA.RI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNr&%C'rs 9.1(4th
ed. 1998).
21.
Vergne, supra note 19, at 253. See also Henry D. Gabriel, The 5Bttle of the
Forms: A Comparison of the United Nations Convention For the InternationalSale of
Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 BUS. LAw. 1053 (1994) [hereinafter
Gabriel, Battle].
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treated like a counter-offer and therefore a rejection. 22 An alternative

to acceptance is estoppel: a party's performance, such as the exercise
of dominion by the buyer over the sold goods, operates as an
acceptance on a theory of estoppel where the offeror can estop the
offeree from denying the existence of a contract based upon the
offeree's performance*23
The common law rules on offer and acceptance have produced
the "last shot doctrine" in the battle of the forms. 24 Under this
doctrine, each new form is considered to be a counter-offer until the
last one is accepted by the conduct of one of the parties. 25 The last
party to send a form before performance on the agreement dictates
the contract terms via "boilerplate. ' 26 The Restatement of Contracts,
reflecting this common-law approach, provides, "[a] reply to an offer
which purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror's assent to
terms additional to or different from those offered is not an
acceptance but is a counter-offer." 27 Under this doctrine, parties
trade forms back and forth until the buyer takes possession of the
goods. The last form exchanged prior to possession operates as the
final counter-offer and this "last shot" becomes the terms of the
28
contract.
The rationale of the mirror-image rule is based on an expectation
that the original offeror, making an offer according to his own terms,
cannot anticipate being bound on terms other than those that he
presented.2 9 It is assumed that each part of a contract, not just the
primary elements of price, quantity and character of the item
exchanged, has a value to the offeror that is incorporated into his
original offer. 30 While the common law rule does not assume that any
change to the offer is necessarily a deal-breaker, it contemplates that
the offeror will want to weigh any changes to determine the value of
the contract.3 1 The mirror-image rule asserts that additions or
modifications to the offer render that offer void, and those changes
32
become a counter-offer, or a "last shot."

22.
Id. at 96.
23.
This doctrine is summarized in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 56
(1979), which states: "[e]xcept as stated in § 69 or where the offer manifests a contrary
intention, it is essential to an acceptance by promise either that the offeree exercise
reasonable diligence to notify the offeror of acceptance or that the offeror receive the
acceptance seasonably."
24.
Gabriel, Battle, supra note 21, at 1054.
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
27.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59 (1979).

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Gabriel, Battle, supra note 21, at 1054.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 17, at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The last shot doctrine has been the subject of much criticism as
being out of step with commercial reality. Modern transactions,
according to this criticism, do not incorporate the kind of detailed
negotiation assumed by the mirror-image rule.33 It is argued that, in
many cases, parties do not even read each other's forms, and that
even if they do, parties do not have the time to slow down
34
In most
negotiations to iron out minor differences between forms.

transactions, merchants agree to the basics, forms are exchanged,
and contracts are concluded without regard for the differences in
come to a halt" if
boilerplate. This suggests that "business would
35
parties were forced to read each other's forms.
As modern merchants do not appear to operate under the
assumptions of the mirror-image rule, some argue that it has
produced perverse responses from the business community. 36 One
such response is for businesses to flood each other with an
unnecessarily high volume of standard forms with the hope of getting
in the last shot.s7 It also has been said to encourage bad faith and
unfair surprise by allowing parties to avoid contracts through the
insertion of meaningless exceptions in their forms. 38
Under the U.S. common law approach, Situation #1 would result
in a finding of no contract for failure by the seller to accept exactly
upon the buyer's terms. There is therefore no agreement subject to
arbitration. If however, the buyer accepts the goods and accompanying
forms as in Situation #2, he is bound to the manufacturer's terms
because they were the last shot.3 9 As such, the distributor will be
Gabriel, Battle, supra note 21, at 1053 (calling the last shot doctrine a
33.
"formalist fiction"); DAVSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 427 (calling the doctrine "so
removed from ordinary commercial understandings, so productive of surprise over
governing terms, and so dependent on the vagaries of the sequence of unread forms [as
to invite] reform.").
& PERILLO, supra note 20, at 96-97. This assumption about
CALAMAIA
34.
modern merchants is not universally accepted, even in the United States where the
last shot doctrine has been almost entirely abandoned. A federal court has found a
contrary customary practice of writing confirmation letters for the purpose of
highlighting form differences. Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc. v. General Electric
Co., 588 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
HONNOLD, supranote 7, at 182.
35.
Rick Rawlings, The Battle of the Forms, 42 MOD. L REV. 715 (1979).
36.
Id.
37.
For an example of the strict application of the mirror-image rule, see Peel v.
38.
Brunswick-Balke-CoUender Co., 110 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1915). This case has been
identified as the "example of why classical contract law needed to be changed in
America." Gabriel, Battle, supra note 21, at 1058. The absurdity of this kind of result
led an English court to modify the rigidity of the mirror image rule in Nicolene Ltd_ v.
Simmonds, [1953] 1 Q.B. 543.
Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, "Battle of the Forms" Under the 1980
39.
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A
Comparison With Section 2-207 UCC and the UNIDROIT Principles, 10 PACE ITtL L
REV. 97, 114-18 (1998). This doctrine, although "anti-economical' and focused on form
rather than substance, has been credited as having the positive effect of "easy
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forced to drive north in pursuit of his contract claim and hope that the
liability limitation does not prevent recovery. The last shot doctrine
has been criticized as encouraging contracts of adhesion, as this tends
40
to place sellers in a superior bargaining position to buyers.
B. The U.S. UCC Approach
American dissatisfaction with the last shot doctrine led to the
adoption of an alternative approach in the Uniform Commercial Code
41
UCC
(UCC) that has displaced the U.S. common-law approach.
Section 2-207 provides:
(1)

(2)

(3)

A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as
an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or
different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or
different terms.
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become
part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is
received.
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In
such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with

application in practice as a result of the willingness of both parties to recognize which
declaration was the last one ....
" Id. at 118.
40.
Kessler, supra note 14, at 632. Kessler noted that
[s]tandard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong bargaining
power. The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in
a position to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the
standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all
competitors use the same clauses . . . thus, standardized contracts are

frequently contracts of adhesion ....
Id. For a contrary example, see Poel, 110 N.E. at 619, where it was the buyer who used
unfair surprise to avoid a factual bargain.
41.
DAWSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 427 (1998) (noting that "legal doctrines
[referring to the common law mirror image rule] so removed from ordinary commercial
understandings, so productive of surprise over governing terms, and so dependent on
the vagaries of the sequence of unread forms invited reform.").
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other

Under this approach, an acknowledgment is treated as an acceptance
of the offer, unless it specifically conditions acceptance upon its own
terms, even though it is not a mirror image of the original offer.4 3
Subsection (1), therefore, does not preclude the existence of a contract
where traditional offer and acceptance have not taken place. 4 As a
result, "neither purchaser nor supplier can afterwards refuse
performance by seizing upon boilerplate discrepancies that had no
economic significance to either party at the time they made their
deal."45 This typically favors the purchaser, whose form, as the
original offer, becomes the contract upon the supplier's
acknowledgment."
Subsection (2) provides that, between merchants, additional
terms are considered part of the contract unless they materially alter
it.4 7 This would seem to mitigate some of the previous gains to
purchasers from subsection (1) by including suppliers' provisions so
long as they are immaterial. 48 In practice, however, courts "nearly
always find clauses in the acknowledgment form to be 'material,'
unless those clauses would be read into the contract in any event
because of trade usage or course of dealing."49
Subsection (3) addresses situations in which the parties'
exchange of forms fails to evidence a contract, but performance
suggests otherwise.5 0 In this situation, the "contract" is said to
42.
JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., APPENDIX TO CONMTACS--UCC ARcILE 2 (SALES)
23(1998).
43.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 17, at 59.

44.
Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards,and the Battle of
the Forms: A Reassessment of§2-2 0 7 , 68 VA. L REV. 1217. 1244 (1982).
45.

CHIREL

46.

Id.

IN, supra note 17, at 59.

This power shift back to the purchaser has been identified as a

response to the kinds of concerns raised by Professor Kessler, supra note 14, at 631-32.
See also Caroline N. Brown, Restoring Peace in the Battle of the Forms: A Framework
for Making Uniform Commercial Code Section 2.207 Work, 69 N.C. L REv. 893 (1991).

Professor Brown argues that the primary purpose of § 2-207 was to "restore the
traditional balance of power between offeror and offeree in contract formation when
forms are used." Id. at 897. "The language of section 2-207 itself," she continues,
"indicates the restoration of the offeror to the former position of dominance." Id. at
906. This, she argues, more properly recognizes the intent of the parties in that the
supplier's response to the purchase order "so strongly evidences assent to the terms of
the offer that the [supplierj must do something very definite and perhaps rather
extraordinary to effect a counter offer." Id. at 907.
47.
The fact that subsection (2) refers only to additional terms, while
subsection (1) refers to both additional and different terms has been the subject of
much debate and illustrates the pitfalls in § 2-207 interpretation. Baird & Weisberg,

supra note 44, at 1240-42. See also 3 R. DUESENBERO & L. KING, SALES & BULK
TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM CONMERCIAL CODE § 3.0311) (1980).
48.
49.
50.

CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 17, at 59.
Baird & Weisberg, supra note 44, at 1246.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 17, at 60.
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consist of those terms upon which the parties' forms agree, with

out and the
conflicting terms from the different boilerplates dropping
51
default of the UCC supplying the remaining terms.
One of the most common justifications for the changes brought
by the UCC to the battle of the forms focuses on its original purpose.
Commentators argue that the framers of the UCC attempted to
devise a standard under which the assent of the parties in a "battle of
the forms" dispute could be determined. 52 It has been noted:
The chief innovation of 2-207 is not its change in the mirror-image rule,
but its abandonment of the very principle of a formal rule of offer and
acceptance. In place of a formal rule, the section substitutes a general
standard under which the court is to look to the gist of the parties'
communications to determine if they have formed a contract. In so
doing, the court is to overlook any express terms in those
53
communications that do not fairly reflect the parties' agreement.

In spite of these lofty purposes, § 2-207 has been roundly
criticized. 4 An example of poor draftsmanship, its language seems
inconsistent with its purposes. 55 While the drafters evinced an intent
to abandon the strictness of the common-law rules, the end product,
particularly § 2-207(2), is a rule that simply transfers bargaining
power from the seller back to the buyer without seeking the intent of

51.
William S. Dodge, Teaching the CISG in Contracts,50 J. LEGAL EDuc. 72,
82 (2000). It has been argued that subsection (3) strikes a balance between the need to
recognize the minimal substantive value in forms exchanged without agreement and
the counter-need to give some effect to the forms to justify their exchange. Brown,
supra note 46, at 927.
52.
John E. Murray, Jr., An Essay on the Formationof Contracts and Related
Matters Under the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of
Goods, 8 J.L. & CoM. 11, 38 (1988) (hereinafter Murray, Essay). Karl Llewellyn, the
"father of the UCC," focused his efforts on a concern that the courts abandon the
formalistic "mirror-image" rule for a standard that recognizes the factual bargain of the
parties. Id. According to Llewellyn, the kinds of parties involved in a "battle of the
forms" were those that dickered over price, quantity, and delivery and had no concern
for or awareness of the "boilerplate" that was inserted by their lawyers. Id. Llewellyn
wanted the UCC to recognize what the parties had in fact recognized-that a deal had
been consummated. Id. See also Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commenting on
"Purpose"in the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 419, 454-55 (1997); John
E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the 'Battle of the Forms', 39 VAND. L. REv. 1307 (1986)
[hereinafter Murray, Chaos]; John E. Murray, Jr., A New Design for the Agreement
Process, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 785 (1968).
53.
Baird & Weisberg, supranote 44, at 1237.
54.
Section 2-207 has been called an "enigma" that has brought "more
controversy than clarity" to the battle of the forms arena. Brown, supra note 46, at
894. Commentators have even gone so far as to call the state of the law in this area
"chaos." Murray, Chaos,supra note 52, at 1308.
55.
Instead of instructing courts to seek out the intent of the parties, § 2-207(2)
imposes the fine print of the buyer rather than the seller. Baird & Weisberg, supra
note 44, at 1244.
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the parties. 56 In theory, this produces a "first shot" rule that simply
substitutes for the common law last shot rule T7 Under this theory,
the party who sends his form first, usually the buyer with a purchase
order, is "master of the offer" and binds the subsequent transaction.l s
If § 2-207 was meant to substitute rigid rules for flexible standards,
subsection (2) seems to have fallen short of that goal. 9
Another major criticism of § 2-207 involves its judicial history.
Commentators have argued that the Roto-Lith decision provided a
poor initial interpretation, followed by mixed subsequent
Courts have applied it reluctantly in certain
interpretations. 60
instances, over-applied it in others, and have avoided interpreting it
too literally. 61 Some have argued, however, that § 2-207's misuse by
the courts has, at times, actually served to promote the drafters'
original intent.62 For instance, although § 2-207(2) seems to produce
a formalistic first shot rule, courts have interpreted it instead to
produce more of a "knockout" rule, where terms of disagreement are
dropped as if the parties were silent and the UCC's provisions
govern. 63 This seems like an overuse of § 2-207(3) by the courts, by
applying it to situations beyond just contract-by-performance, but has
been supported as a correction against the somewhat formal statutory
language of § 2-207(2) in order to honor the parties' intent.64
Under the UCC approach, the buyer and seller indicated an
intent to contract in hypothetical Situation #1. The seller's sales
acknowledgment would be deemed an acceptance of the buyer's
purchase order. The seller's provision on limitation of liability would

56.
Vergne, supra note 19, at 253. This "harshness" toward sellers deprives
them of protection that they might have had from their own forms, because additional
terms will be ignored under § 2-207(2). Id.
57.
Whether § 2-207(2) produces a first shot rule has been a subject of
considerable debate among contracts scholars. For an argument that it does not
produce this rule in practice, see Baird & Weisberg, supra note 44, at 1247.
Id.
58.
59.
Baird & Weisberg, supra note 44, at 1240-41.
David Frisch, Commercial Conmnon Law, the United Nations Convention on
60.
the InternationalSale of Goods, and the Inertiaof Habit, 74 TUL L REv. 495, 517-29.
The Roto-Lith case was the first opportunity courts had to interpret § 2-207. Roto-Lith,
Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962), overruled by Ionics, Inc. v.
Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 100 F.3d 184 (lst Cir. 1997). Rather than treating this as a
consideration of first instance, however, the Roto.Lith court ignored § 2.207(2) and
applied the mirror-image rule. Frisch, supra, at 526. It then ignored § 2.207(3) and
applied the last shot rule. Id. at 526-27.
61.
SAMUEL WILLISrON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 142 (4th ed.
1990).
62.
Baird & Weisberg, supra note 44, at 1247.
See id.
63.
Two commentators note this judicial overuse of subsection (3) as supportive
64.
of their belief that "whether § 2-207 is a badly drafted statute is not of great concern,
because courts have used it for nearly three decades in a manner consistent with the
principles on which it rests." Baird & Weisberg, supra note 44, at 1248.
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probably not become part of the contract, because it would be viewed
as "material" under § 2-207(2)(b). 65 The arbitration provision, as a
"different" but not "additional" term, would probably be rejected
66
under the same reasoning.
The case of contract-by-conduct in Situation #2 would be
governed under § 2-207(3).67 The knockout rule would apply, making
the terms of the contract those that the parties had agreed upon and
excluding all of the disputed terms. 68 Remaining terms would be
69
supplied by the UCC default rules.
C. The CanadianApproach
70
Commercial law in Canada is rooted in English common law.
Canadian sale of goods law is traceable to England's 1893 Sale of
Goods Act. 7 1
U.S. advances in contract law have increasingly
influenced Canada because of its close ties with its neighbor to the
south. 72 Canadian sales law remains distinct from both England and
the United States because it lacks national uniformity. 73 As with the

65.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
66.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
67.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
68.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
69.
Id.
70.
Jacob S. Ziegel, The Future of Commercial Law in Canada, 20 U.B.C. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1986) [hereinafter Ziegel, Future]. Professor Ziegel notes that this
connection to English law "is hardly surprising given the close political, economic,
cultural and legal ties that bound the nascent Canadian federation to the United
Kingdom." Id.
71.
Laura A. Donner, Recent Development: Impact of the Vienna Sales
Convention on Canada,6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 743, 746 (1992). It is important to note
that Quebec, with its separate historical ties to France, developed a civil law system
independent of the other Canadian provinces and therefore does not fit into the
characterizations described above. See also Lisa K. Tomko, Note, United States
Convention on the International Sale of Goods: Its Effect on United States and
Canadian Sales Law, 66 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 73, 73 n.1 (1988). However, Quebec
has adopted the CISG along with all of the other Canadian provinces. See, e.g., Jacob
S. Ziegel, Canada'sFirstDecision on the InternationalSales Convention, 32 CAN. BUS.
L.J. 313, 313 n. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Ziegel, FirstDecision].
72.
Errol P. Mendes, The U.N. Sales Convention & U.S.-Canada Transactions;
Enticing the World's Largest TradingBloc To Do Business Under a Global Sales Law, 8
J.L. & COM. 109, 143 (1988). Professor Mendes notes that the movement of Canada
toward American contract principles is "inevitabl[e]," but warns that until that move is
complete "there will remain significant differences between Canadian and American
commercial law .. " Id.
73.
Donner, supra note 71, at 746. Although the United States does not have a
federal contract law, the broad acceptance of the UCC by the states has made it the do
facto national contract law in the United States. See also Henry D. Gabriel, The
Inapplicabilityof the United Nations Convention on the InternationalSale of Goods as
a Model for the Revision of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 TUL. L.
REV. 1995, 1998 (1998) [hereinafter Gabriel, Inapplicability] (commenting that the
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common law generally, however, there are principles that outline the
Canadian approach to the battle of the forms. Those principles are
similar to the American common law approach and emphasize the
74
mirror image rule and the last shot doctrine.
There are, however, ways in which Canadian law has mitigated

the harshness of the common law rules in contracts-by-conduct. The
first is to avoid the severity of the last shot doctrine where the parties
have not had prior dealings.7 5 In Tywood Industries,Ltd. v.St. AnneNackavic Pulp & Paper Co., the buyer's form was deemed to be the
last shot and contained a clause that required arbitrationJ 6 The
court declined to enforce the arbitration clause, however, because the
buyer did not object when the seller failed to return the purchase
order form. 77 The court was apparently moved by a sense of equity to
protect the seller where the buyer had not explicitly made his
78
acceptance conditional upon the terms of his form.
Canadian law has also mitigated the common law rules by
allowing for contracts-by-conduct to contain those provisions upon
which the parties agree. 79 The last form in the battle, then, does not
supply open terms.8 0 This is very similar to UCC § 2-207(3), which
knocks out disagreement between forms in contracts-by-conduct and
fills the gaps with UCC default rules.8 1 In Canadian law, it is
unclear what source of law will be used to supply open terms to the
82
contract-by-conduct.
The Canadian approach has suffered from the same criticisms
that have been leveled at the U.S. common law approach. It has
remained intact, however, despite efforts to supplant it with a

influence of the UCC on American commercial practices has been "quite considerable"
because it "has been adopted in some form in all fifty states.").
74.
Morris G. Shanker, "Battle of the Forms": A Comparison and Critique of
Canadian,American and HistoricalCommon Law Perspectires, 4 CAN. Bus. LJ. 263.
268-69 (1980).
75.
Gabriel, Battle, supranote 21, at 1056.
76.
Tywood Industries, Ltd. v. St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp & Paper Co., 100
D.L-R.3d 374 (Ont.H.C. 1979).
77.
Id. at 377-78.
78.
Id.
79.
Shanker, supranote 74, at 267. Professor Shanker inferred this rejection of
the last shot doctrine from a proposed Ontario Sale of Goods Act. Id. Because the
language of that Act was similar to that provided by UCC § 2-207(3). he argued that
the outcome in a contract-by-conduct situation would be the same as that provided by
the UCC. Id. at 266 n.7.
80.
Id. at 268.
81.
Gabriel, Battle, supra note 21, at 1057.
82.
Professor Shanker assumes that the terms will be provided by the Ontario
Sale of Goods Act. Shanker, supra note 74, at 268. However, subsequent ritings have
indicated that this might not be true. See, e.g., Gabriel, Battle, supra note 21. at 1057
(noting that the source for this development in Canada is the common law. not statute);
Tomko, supra note 71, at 85 (calling this area of Canadian law one of "huge . .
uncertainty which could be alleviated by a uniform set of rules").
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uniform law modeled after the UCC.8
The Ontario Law Reform
Commission rejected adoption of§ 2-207 on the grounds that:
[slo long as the "agreement" is still executory and the parties have not
proceeded beyond the exchange of forms, there is no undue hardship in
applying existing rules of offer and acceptance and finding that there is
no concluded agreement between the parties. The "mirror image" rule
of acceptance may enable one or the other party to escape from a
bargain that he no longer finds to his liking but such cases do not
84
appear to arise often in practice.

Under the Canadian approach, as under the U.S. common law
approach, the seller would have no claim for contract damages in
Situation #1 for failure of agreement. 85 In Situation #2, however, the
attempts by Canadian law to mitigate the mirror image rule might
change the outcome of the contract-by-conduct. If the parties had no
prior dealings, the harshness of the last shot doctrine could be
avoided by not enforcing the seller's additional provision on limitation
of liability under the authority of Tywood Industries.8 6 It is not clear
how that case would dispose of the different provisions on contract
enforcement. Another possibility for avoiding the last shot doctrine
would be to set the terms of the agreement as those upon which the
parties agreed, and throw out different or additional terms.8 7 In this
case, there would be little guidance as to what the open terms should
be, resolving only that the distributor would be unable to require
enforcement in Tennessee and that the manufacturer would be
88
unable to enforce his arbitration and liability limitation clauses.
D. The CISG Approach
The CISG offers its own solution to the battle of the forms in
Article 19:

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

(1)

A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but
contains additions, limitations or other modifications is a
rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer.

(2)

However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance
but contains additional or different terms which do not
materially alter the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance,
unless the offeror, without under delay, objects orally to the
discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect. If he does not
so object, the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with
the modifications contained in the acceptance.

Shanker, supranote 74, at 273-74.
ONTARIO LAW REFORI COMM'N, 1 REPORT ON SALE OF GOODS 83-84 (1979).
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the
price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time
of delivery, extent of one party's liability to the other or the
settlement of disputes are considered to alter the terms of the
offer materially. 89

Section 1 of Article 19 embraces the common law notion of offer
and acceptance embodied in the mirror image rule. 90 It does so for a
number of reasons. The first is that the mirror image rule is
consistent with both common law and civil law systems, so that the
CISG is broadly in line with the many different legal traditions that
it attempts to accommodate. 91 The second is that, however harsh it
may seem, the mirror image rule is more predictable and much easier
to apply than its UCC counterpart. 92 The drafters of the Convention
considered adopting the UCC approach, but explicitly rejected it with
the sanction of the American delegates, who admitted the difficulties
in applying § 2-207 and seemed content to revert to the pre-UCC
93
doctrine.

Section 2 of Article 19 attempts to mitigate the severity of the
mirror image rule by allowing for non-material terms to remain in a

contract. 94 This relaxation "is premised on the idea that, at least at

89.
HoNNOLD, supranote 7, at 183-84.
90.
Gabriel, Battle, supra note 21, at 1058 (commenting that Article 19
embraces the common law mirror image rule). See also Magellan Int'l Corp. v.
Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19386, *17 (N.D. 1l. 1999) (noting
that "[Art. 19(1)] reflects the common law's 'mirror image' rule that the UCC has
rejected."); Filanto S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (finding that "[the CISG] reverses the rule of Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207,
and reverts to the common law rule.); Dodge, supra note 51, at 82 (noting that "Ithe
CISG ...adopts what is essentially a mirror-image rule."); Courtney Parrish Smart,
Comment, Formationof Contracts in Louisiana Under the United Nations Convention
For the InternationalSale of Goods, 53 LA. L. REv. 1339, 1351 (1993) (recognizing that
"[t]he Convention adopts the 'mirror image' rule in article 19(1)."); Donner, supra note
71, at 749 (noting that "Paragraph 1 [of Article 19] appears consistent with the
Canadian mirror image requirement."); Murray, Essay, supra note 52, at 41 (arguing
that "Article 19(1) is designed to replicate the 'matching acceptance' rule of the
common law notwithstanding the repudiation of that concept under the Uniform
Commercial Code."); Tomko, supra note 71, at 88 (arguing that "[Article 191 is much
like the Canadian mirror image rule.").
91.
Vergne, supra note 19, at 255. The author notes that the CISG approach is
similar to the English and American common law systems, as well as the civil law
systems of France, Germany, Japan, and most Scandinavian countries. Id.
92.
See supra note 30. See also Vergne, supranote 19, at 256 (commenting that
"[i]t
should be noted that the solution of Article 19 is simpler and easier to apply than
the UCC's.").
93.
Murray, Essay, supra note 52, at 3940. Professor Murray finds it
unsurprising that the CISG delegates could not be persuaded to adopt the UCC
approach. He attributes this to the judicial evolution of § 2-207, calling it a "miserable
flop." Id. See supra note 44. But see supra note 50 (suggesting that the judicial
evolution of§ 2-207 might be one of its few redeeming qualities).
94.
HONNOLD, supra note 7, at 167 (noting that while paragraph (1) of Article
19 "states the traditional and widely accepted" mirror image rule, "[p]aragraphs (2)
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some point, the parties' reliance on the transaction deserves
protection." 95
Although this is inconsistent with the traditional
mirror image rule, it represents the same kind of attempts at
mitigation made by courts applying equitable principles to alleviate
the rule's harshness. 96 Section 2 has been analogized to § 2-207 as an
attempt by the drafters to exhibit a degree of sensitivity to the intent
of the parties. 97 The broad definition of materiality in section 3,
however, suggests that few provisions will prevent a party from
escaping a contract and that therefore the harshness of the mirror
image rule remains. 98 Much of the criticism leveled at this approach
comes from defenders of the UCC who attack it in the same vein as
they did the U.S. common law approach. 99
One notable absence from Article 19 is any kind of separate
provision for contracts-by-conduct. The CISG seems conflicted in its
approach to this problem. 10 0 Since Article 19 is silent on this issue,
contracts-by-conduct are addressed in a manner similar to the U.S.
common law approach where performance constitutes acceptance of
the other party's last shot. 101 This rejects both the UCC approach in
§ 2-207(3) and that forwarded by Canadian courts. 10 2 Article 8(2) of
the CISG, however, provides that ambiguities between forms in the
face of performance "are to be interpreted according to the

and (3) state exceptions from the traditional rule."). It has been noted that while
paragraphs 2 and 3 attempt to mitigate the harshness of the mirror image rule, "[that]
mitigation is almost not worth the candle." Murray, Essay, supra note 52, at 41.
95.
Vergne, supra note 19, at 250.
96.
For an English example mitigating the mirror image rule, see supra note
29. For the Canadian examples, see supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
97.
Murray, Essay, supra note 52, at 42-43.
98.
Dodge, supra note 51, at 83. See also Murray, Essay, supra note 52, at 40
(commenting that although Article 19 is not a complete adoption of the mirror image
rule, "the differences between that antiquarian view and CISG are insignificant.").
99.
The bulk of comparison between the CISG and the UCC has come in the
context of revision of the UCC. Most commentators reject the notion that the CISG
should serve as a model for UCC revision. See, e.g., Gabriel, Inapplicability,supra note
73; Viscasillas, supra note 39; Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and
the CISG and the Construction of Uniform Law, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1021 (1996)
(discussing differences between CISG and UCC concepts) [hereinafter Ferrari,
Relationship]; Peter Winship, As the World Turns: Revisiting Rudolf Schlesinger's
Study of the Uniform Commercial Code "In the Light of Comparative Law", 29 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1143 (1996) (examining the UCC in light of comparative law) [hereinafter,
Winship, As the World Turns]; Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales
In Light of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of
Goods, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 165 (1995) (analyzing uniformity and harmony in

commercial law); Gabriel, Battle, supra note 21; Peter Winship, Domesticating
International Commercial Law: Revising U.C.C. Article 2 in Light of the United
Nations Sales Convention, 37 LOY. L. REV. 43 (1991) (reviewing the similarities and
differences between the CISG and the UCC) [hereinafter Winship, Domesticating].
100.
HONNOLD, supra note 7, at 115.
101.

Viscasillas, supra note 39, at 114-15.

102.

Id.
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understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other
party would have had in the same circumstances." 10 3 This suggests
that doubt should be resolved against the party who created it, but
still remains far short of the knockout rule of § 2-207(3).104
The interpretation of Article 19 in American courts illustrates its
radical difference from UCC § 2-207. Although U.S. courts have only
rarely interpreted the CISG (a subject to be discussed more fully
later), two cases have interpreted Article 19 in adjudicating the battle
of the forms. The first, Filanto, S.p.A v.Chilewich International
Corp., involved the sale of shoes between an Italian footwear
manufacturer and an American export-import firm. 105 The buyer,
Chilewich, sent a purchase order to Filanto that contained a clause
requiring arbitration in Russia. 10 6 Filanto responded with an
acknowledgment that accepted the Chilewich order, but excluded the
arbitration clause from the agreement. 10 7 The parties subsequently
negotiated orally over the arbitration clause, but proceeded to
perform on the contract before reaching a complete agreement. 0 8
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
ruled that this action was governed not by the UCC, but rather by the
CISG. 09s Although Filanto's acknowledgment would be "an acceptance
with a proposal for a material modification" under UCC § 2-207, CISG
Article 19(1) required it to be considered a counter-offer.' 10 Chilewich
did not implicitly accept this counter-offer through his non-objection
under 19(2) because the Court found the arbitration clause to be a
material alteration under 19(3). 11 The Court ultimately found,
however, that subsequent oral negotiations evinced Filanto's assent to
arbitration and it sent the case to Russia to settle the dispute as
harsh
agreed. 1 2 Thus, the court invoked Article 19, but avoided its 113
outcome by considering evidence beyond the exchanged vrritings.
While the Filanto case illustrates the room left in the CISG for
court creativity in seeking out the intent of the parties, another
recent case, Magellan International Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel

103.
104.

HoNNOLD, supranote 7, at 115.
Id. at 191-92.

105. FKlanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1230.
106. Id. at 1231-32.
107.
Id. at 1232.
108. Id. at 1233.
109.
Id. at 1237.
110. Id. at 1238.
111.
Id.
112.
Id. at 1240.
113. Id. Professor Dodge argues that, in allowing the battle of the forms
analysis to go astray under Article 19, the court was probably trying to achieve the
same result that it would have reached under the UCC. Dodge, supra note 51, at 84. If
that theory is valid, then this part of Filanto illustrates the same need for uniform
interpretation as discussed subsequently in this Note. See infra notes 165-67 and
accompanying text.
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GmbH, suggests that the strict application of the mirror image rule
may be more common. 114 Magellan involved a dispute over whether
the pleading requirements for a breach of contract had been met
under the CISG. 1 15 Article 19 governed in determining whether there
had been an adequate offer and acceptance to constitute a contract. 116
Magellan, an American distributor of steel products, negotiated for a
deal with Salzgitter, a steel trader in Germany, in which Salzgitter
would act as middle man in the acquisition of steel bars. 117 In its
first letter, Magellan provided Salzgitter with written specifications
for the product, proposed pricing, and agreed to issue a letter of credit
as payment. 118 Salzgitter responded by proposing prices higher than
Magellan suggested." l9 Magellan then accepted those increases and
memorialized the material terms of the deal in the form of two
purchase orders. 120 Salzgitter accepted those purchase orders, but
sent its own confirmation form that differed from Magellan's
purchase orders with respect to vessel loading conditions, dispute
resolution, and choice of law. 12 1
While the parties attempted to reconcile these differences,
122
Salzgitter began to press Magellan to open its line of credit.
Although Magellan wanted to "fine-tune" all aspects of the deal before
going forward, Salzgitter pushed Magellan to accept the deal on
assurances that the details had been settled. 123 Magellan opened the
line of credit, but then was asked to amend the line of credit to permit
inclusion of substitute guarantees of delivery. 12 4 When Magellan
refused to change the letter of credit, Salzgitter found the refusal to
be a breach of contract and stopped delivery. 125 This prompted
Magellan to withdraw the line of credit and sue on what he felt was
Salzgitter's breach by failing to deliver. 126 Salzgitter responded to
the suit with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
127
claim.
The Court addressed its decision regarding Salzgitter's 12(b)(6)
motion by stating that, although the CISG did not make specific
reference to pleading requirements, the general structure of the CISG

114.

Magellan, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19386, at *15.

115.
116.

Id. at *13.
Id.

117.

Id. at*2.

119.

Id. at *3.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id.

125.

Id. at *6.

126.

Id.

127.

Id. at *1.

118.

Id. at *2-3.
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illustrated the "common sense" requirements of contract formation,
performance by the plaintiff, breach by the defendant, and injury to the
plaintiff.m The court focused its battle of the forms discussion on
whether there was a sufficient offer and acceptance to constitute a
contract. 1 29 Although Magellan's purchase orders certainly constituted
an offer, Salzgitter's response with price changes was viewed as a
counter-offer under Article 19(1) rather than an acceptance under the
UCC. 1L3 The court found the subsequent exchanges by the parties to
be continued offers and counter-offers that concluded with Magellan's
performance when it issued the line of credit. 13 1 As this decision was
limited to the 12(b)(6) ruling, the court did not discuss what the terms
of the contract would be, but was content to find only that a contract
existed based on Magellan's performance. 3 2 In finding a contract-byconduct, the court seems to have implied that the last shot doctrine
would apply. 3 3 If this is the case, Magellan's performance constituted
"complete (mirrored) assent" to the last form sent by Salzgitter. 4 As
such, the terms of the contract would include the provisions of its
confirmation form that specified vessel loading conditions, dispute
resolution, and choice of law. 135 If the CISG made any attempt to
mitigate the harshness of the last shot doctrine in contracts-byconduct, that buried attempt was lost on the court in Magellan.
Magellan illustrates that the reality of Article 19 is its strict adherence
to the mirror image rule and that efforts at mitigation are dependent
on a court's discretion.
Under the CISG approach, then, the computer parts
manufacturer and distributor would seem to be back where they
found themselves under the U.S. common law approach. There would
be no enforceable contract under Situation #1. The last shot doctrine
would govern the dispute in Situation #2, favoring the manufacturer
as the party who wrote the last form and allowing his provisions on
136
contract enforcement and liability to govern the disagreement.
One hope for the distributor, however, would be to point to conduct
outside of the writings that indicated the manufacturer's accession to
his terms.'3 7 Barring the existence of these facts, however, the
manufacturer is advantaged under this approach.

128.

Id at *15.

129.

Id.

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id at *17.
Id. at *18.
Id.
Id. It should be noted that no mention of the last shot doctrine was made

in the court's opinion.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at *4.
See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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138
III. HARMONIZING THE CISG WITH DOMESTIC LAWS

A. The Need for Vertical Uniformity
One of the most evident challenges to harmonizing the CISG
with the domestic laws of the United States and Canada is in the
previously illustrated fact that each offers distinct solutions to issues
like the battle of the forms problem. It has been argued that
uniformity among these approaches-what is known as vertical
uniformity between domestic law and international law-is necessary
between nations like the United States and Canada that share high
volumes of transactions, and that the need for uniformity increases as
the volume of trade increases. 139 It is also argued that a single set of
rules would give transnational trading partners a sense of certainty,
and that this sense of certainty would promote the free flow of goods
140
between nations and stimulate economic and social development.
The need for vertical uniformity is increasingly evident amidst a
changed understanding of commercial transactions that now is
"rooted in the centralization and interdependence of international
markets.
.141
Vertical uniformity would eliminate the

138.
This Note distinguishes between harmonization as solutions to the battle of
the forms that are compatible and uniformity as solutions to the battle of the forms
that are identical. Rend David, The International Unification of Private Law, in 2
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 5 (1971); Martin Boodman, The

Myth of HarmonizationofLaws, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 699, 700-02 (1991). But see Steven
Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 671, 674 n.4
(1999) (treating uniformity and harmonization of law as synonyms); Arthur Rosett,
CriticalReflections on the UnitedNations Convention on Contractsfor the International
Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265, 268 (1984) (arguing that the CISG is not an
instrument for harmonization, but is instead an independent body of commercial law
for a very specified subset of international trade).
139.
Kozolchyk, supra note 5, at 1. Kozolchyk, the Director of the National Law
Center for Inter-American Free Trade, argues that the high-volume, high-speed
transactions that have come as a result of the opening of borders among North
American nations "require rules that can be applied to each transaction as uniformly,
quickly, mechanically or automatically as possible." Id. at 2. He argues that the "topdown" approach of achieving uniformity through legislation like the CISG needs to be
balanced by a "bottom-up," or "best practices," approach that develops the uniform law
based on the experiences of practitioners and their clients in order to best suit their
needs. Id. at 7. This kind of an approach to the battle of the forms could help to settle
the dispute over which of the approaches outlined above is most suitable, or might even
result in the development of a new approach that proves to be superior to those of
either the UCC or its competitors. See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
140.
Speidel, supra note 99, at 170.
141.
Id. at 170-71. For a historical discussion of the development of the need for
vertical uniformity, see Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretationof the 1980 Uniform
Sales Law, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183, 184-97 [hereinafter Ferrari, Uniform
Interpretation].
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jurisdictional lines between domestic and international
law that seem
142
arbitrary to parties that contract internationally.
Canadian lawmakers might yield to the CISG solution for the
sake of uniformity since the Canadian solution to the battle of the
forms problem shares the same basic mirror image principles as the
CISG solution."4 However, the goal of vertical uniformity in Canada
could be derailed by limitations within the Canadian Constitution.
The Constitution of 1867 fails to give its federal government a clear
power to implement treaties. 144 For this reason, Canada has been
kept from playing a role in the debates that developed the CISG in
1980 and delayed its ratification of the CISG until 1992.14r In the
end, Canada ratified the CISG only because each of the provinces
chose to adopt it of their own volition. 4 6 Efforts at vertical
uniformity in the battle of the forms could require the same kind of
independent adoption by each of the provinces. While this could have
the same successful outcome as the CISG enjoyed, it opens the
possibility that each province would extend its own solution, in which
case uniformity would be frustrated.
Efforts at vertical uniformity between the CISG and U.S.
contract law face a much more pronounced initial obstacle. The CISG
and the UCC are very different in their solutions to the battle of the
forms. 147

Although U.S. scholars have generally recognized the

abundance of problems associated with the UCC approach, there

142.
Speidel, supra note 99, at 171. See also Michael Kabik, Through The
Looking-Glass: International Trade in the "Wonderland" of the United Nattons
Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods, 9 I'r'LTAX & Bus. Lw.
408, 409 (1992) (noting that "[i]nternational trade has been hindered by a myriad of
distinct domestic laws governing the sale of goods..." and finding that United States'
adoption of the CISG was a step toward uniformity that offers many benefits to
American business interests.); Susanne Cook, Note, The Need for Uniform
Interpretationof the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the International
Sale of Goods, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 197 (1988) (noting that international trade has a
special need for universal and predictable rules). But see Walt, supra note 138, at 672
(arguing that "uniformity in law is a mixed blessing and not an unqualified good.").
Professor Walt finds three risks in vertical uniformity:. (1) uniformity can increase the
impact of inefficient rules, increasing the transaction costs to parties where domestic
rules might have left a transaction unregulated; (2) legislative uniformity risks a
divergence of application in the absence of a single interpretive tribunal (an issue that
is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 165-205); and (3) where a uniform law is
novel in its approach, it risks uncertainty in what it actually requires, Id. at 672-73.
143.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
144.
Ziegel, Future,supra note 70, at 21-22.
145.
See id. at 22-23. Canada's lack of involvement in the development of
international law is also attributed to a lack of interest among Canadian legal scholars
coupled with a failure to recognize the importance of this development to Canada's
trading interests. Id. at 23. This may, however, be a historical criticism that no longer
has as much force, in light of Canada's involvement in NAFTA and its ratification of
the CISG.
146.
Ziegel, FirstDecision, supra note 71, at 313 n.l.
147.
See supra notes 41-69 and 89-137 and accompanying text.
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seems to be a collective hesitance to abandon it for the mirror image
rule. 148 Much of this discussion has come in the context of UCC
revision, where many have specifically rejected the CISG as a model,
in spite of the uniformity that such revision would provide. 149
It is in this setting that the CISG has received much of its
criticism, as many U.S. scholars question its ability to act as a vehicle
for harmonization and vertical uniformity. 150 One such criticism
focuses on the sources of law upon which the CISG was based. As an
international effort focused on the goal of a final product that could be
ratified by nations with vastly different legal traditions, the CISG did
not develop with a sense of a common background law. 151 In fact, its
authors designed the CISG to operate independently of domestic
52
laws, creating instead its own sphere of international transactions.
The drafters of the UCC, on the other hand, deliberately designed it
amidst the background of U.S. common law such that "there are fallback principles that reduce the need for complete elaboration of all
aspects of contract law in a code." 1 53 This was one of the driving

principles behind the formation of the UCC-codified law could only
be effective if it was considerate of the evolved contract principles in
which it would operate. 15 4 Karl Llewellyn argued that any effort to
codify commercial law in the absence of this kind of consideration
"would be shortsighted, and ultimately ineffective." 155 Attempts to
achieve vertical uniformity between the CISG and the UCC may
result in many areas of uncertainty and incompatibility as a result of
156
this difference in background law.
One possible solution to this incompatibility would be to displace
UCC provisions with the CISG in areas where the differences
between them are minimal and maintain diversity in areas where the
differences are substantial, such as the battle of the forms. 157 Some

148.
See supra note 99.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
Speidel, supra note 99, at 172. Spiedel argues that the CISG represents
more of a compromise between legal traditions than a response to the realities of
international trade. Id. at 175.
152.
Id. at 175.
153.
Id. at 171.
154.
Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commercial Codification as Negotiation, 32
U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 17, 47 (1998).
155.
Id.
156.
Gabriel, Inapplicability,supra note 73, at 2003.
157.
This has been articulated as "a more persuasive intermediate position" for
achieving uniformity between the 0ISG and the UCC. Winship, Domesticating,supra
note 99, at 48. Under this approach, there is a three-part strategy: (1) identify issues
that are so important so as to justify differences between the UCC and the CISG; (2)
identify issues so unimportant that unnecessary differences, even in language, can be
eliminated for the sake of uniformity; and (3) establish devices to ensure that parties
know how the CISG and the UCC complement each other. Id. at 47-49.
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argue that there are a number of advances in the UCC, including its
efforts to protect the buyer in § 2-207, that "express underlying
cultural and social expectations" that are unique to the contract law
of the United States. 158 In these areas, expectations should be
preserved unless uniformity is absolutely essential.' 5"
There is one comfort in this discussion:
perhaps vertical
uniformity in the battle of the forms is not sufficiently important to
justify supplanting the social and cultural expectations of either the
United States or Canada. The battle of the forms is an area that is
litigated with such infrequency that parties do not seem to change
their contractual behavior based upon the regime in which they
operate.' 6 0 Commenting on the paucity of litigation in this area, one
scholar noted:
[i]t
is fortunate that problems arising out of the "battle of the forms" do
not arise more frequently for legal science has not yet found a
satisfactory way to decide what the parties have "agreed" when they
have consummated a transaction on the basis of the routine exchange
16 1
of inconsistent forms.

Similarly, a Canadian corporation noted that even though it
processed more than eighteen thousand contracts per year that were
potentially subject to a battle of the forms, it had gone for seventeen
years without such a problem. 162 That company found that the risks
of contractual uncertainty were virtually non-existent where
litigation was only a remote possibility. 6 3
Professor Gabriel's
Practitioner'sGuide to the CISG and the UCC noted that, although
the two codes have different theoretical approaches to the battle of
the forms, those differences "may have little practical effect" because
both codes "make a contract enforceable after delivery and acceptance
and the majority of disputes arise after the goods have been delivered
and found to be defective or not what the buyer wanted."' 64 In this
light, the disparities between the CISG and the domestic laws of
Canada and the United States might be tolerable for the simple fact
that they do not attract much attention in litigation.

158.
159.
160.

Speidel, supra note 99, at 186.
Id. at 186-87.
HONNOLD, supranote 7, at 182-83.

161.
162.

Id. at 183.
Grant G. Murray, A Corporate Counsel's Perspectite of the "Battle of the

Forms", 4 CAN. BUS. L.J. 290, 293-94 (1980).
163.

Id. at 295.

164.
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CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) AND THE UNIFORI
COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC 63 (1995).
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B. The Need for Uniform Interpretationof the CISG
If the CISG is to become a body of law that can be used
predictably by parties to international contracts, judges and
arbitrators who sit in different foreign jurisdictions must interpret it
uniformly. 165 This presents another challenge to harmonizationinterpretation by diverse jurisdictions. Uniformity is only possible
where a text is not only legislated for uniform applicability, but also
grows consistently through uniform judicial interpretation. 166
Growth of the CISG toward uniformity requires that national courts
167
promote uniformity of application in CISG case law.
One of the first obstacles to such international development is
the language barrier between the many different nations that have
adopted the CISG. 168 The CISG is printed in many different official
and unofficial language versions, opening the possibility for diverse
interpretations based only on translation. 169 Although the shared
language between the United States and most of Canada mitigates
this language barrier, it could become a source of difficulty between

The Validity
165.
Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog:
Exception to the Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 18 YALE J.
INTL L. 1, 6 (1993). Predictability is one of the most important goals of a uniform law,
and will be lost so long as the CISG is interpreted divergently. Id. at 7. Interpretation
of the CISG without a sense for international judicial uniformity "would only entail
consequences that certainly are contrary to the goals intended to be achieved by the
elaboration of a uniform law." Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation,supra note 141, at 203.
166.
Michael F. Sturley, International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The
Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation,27 VA. J. INT'L L. 729, 731-32
(1987). The experience of American lawyers with the UCC has been used as an
example of the need for uniform interpretation. Id. at 732. The official commentary to
the UCC notes the importance of "uniformity of construction," and it has been argued
that such uniformity is even more important in the international context. Id.
167.
Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N.
Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAW. 443, 483
(1989). Because the CISG has been made the law of both Canada and the United
States, it is treated in this Note as a source that demands acknowledgment and use by
lawyers and judges in this part of the world. However, some choose to treat the CISG
as only a possible solution for the needs of international trade. See id. at 482 (arguing
that the CISG should be judged by whether it improves the need for unification of trade
laws). In spite of this, the CISG continues to receive support as a workable solution to
these needs. John E. Murray, Jr., The Neglect of the CISG: A Workable Solution, 17
J.L. & CoM. 365, 379 (1998) [hereinafter Murray, Neglect]. But see James E. Bailey,
Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of InternationalSales, 32 CORNELL INT' L.J.
273, 276 (1999) (arguing that the CISG's "misguided goal, its character as a
multinational treaty, its specific provisions, and its incorporation into the United
States as a self-executing treaty" have contributed to its failure to achieve uniformity).
Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation,supra note 141, at 205.
168.
169.
Murray, Neglect, supra note 167, at 366.
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the United States and Quebec, where the official language is
French. 7 0
UNCITRAL, the United Nations body that works to implement
the CISG and promote other efforts at international trade
harmonization, has attempted to alleviate the language barrier
problem by centrally processing the decisions of national tribunals
interpreting the CISG, translating those decisions into the various
official languages for use by the tribunals of other nations.171 This at
72
least provides for a single official translator of decisions.'
UNCITRAL's distribution of foreign decisions illustrates another
barrier to development of international case law. The CISG instructs
courts in Article 7 that [iln the interpretation of this Convention,
regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to
promote uniformity in its application...." This calls courts to rise
above their domestic perspectives and make decisions in the context
of an international, as opposed to a domestic, perspective. 7 3 This has
been identified as the key issue to uniformity: that the interpreter of
the CISG "must consider the decisions rendered by judicial bodies of
other contracting States .

.

. in which case such decisions can have

either the value of precedent ... or [at least] a persuasive value."174
Such a perspective should lead to the development of an international

170.

Because Quebec has its own unique cultural and legal traditions, it is often

omitted from comparisons between the United States and Canada. Donner, supra note
71, at 746 n.26.
171.
Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation,supra note 141, at 206.
172. 1&
173. HONNOLD, supra note 7, at 88. Article 7 calls for an autonomous
interpretation of the CISG-one that is "independent from the particular concepts of a
specific legal system"-even when it involves interpreting words that are familiar
through their domestic use. Ferrari, Relationship, supra note 99, at 1024. This kind of
an approach precludes recourse to domestic interpretive techniques, which would
introduce innumerable conflicts into attempts at uniform interpretation. Id. at 1025.
See also Murray, Neglect, supra note 167, at 367. Murray notes that the imperative of
Article 7 is quite unclear in application, but assumes that it requires a court 'to
transcend its domestic perspective and become a different court that is no longer
influenced by the law of its own nation state." Id- The imperative of autonomous
interpretation is particularly challenging because, in the case of the CISG, there is no
background law on which to rely to fill the gaps in the case of poor or incomplete
drafting (unlike the UCC, which was drafted in the context of and acknowledged the
background common law). See also Gabriel, Inapplicability,supra note 73, at 2003;
Frisch, supra note 60, at 507. The expectation that a national court could involve itself
in an autonomous interpretation has been said to "border on the absurd." Murray,
Neglect, supra note 167, at 373.
174. Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation,supra note 141, at 204-05. In 1988, when
the CISG was first established as law in the United States, it was predicted that its
success would depend upon the extent to which U.S. courts would consider foreign
decisions in their own interpretation of the Convention. Cook, supra note 142, at 198.
Based upon that prediction, the success of the CISG in the United States has been
minimal. See infra text accompanying notes 176-80.
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body of case law that would aid in the goals of uniformity and
175
predictability.
Experience shows, however, that judges are interpreting and
applying the CISG through the lens of domestic law and without
regard to the interpretations of foreign tribunals. This is, perhaps,
most blatantly revealed by a recent U.S. case that, instead of
applying the CISG with an international perspective, suggested that
the domestic principles of UCC Article 2 "may also inform a court
where the language of the relevant CISG provision tracks that of
Article 2."176 The court made continued reference to the CISG and
even recognized the international character of its position in the case,
but in the end it was unable to lift itself out of its domestic
177
perspective.
This same failure to divorce decision-making from the domestic
perspective plagued the cases discussed earlier that adjudicated the
battle of the forms under the CISG. In Filanto,the court adjudicated
an issue ancillary to Article 19 by citing the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and then adding, almost as an afterthought, that "[t]he Sale
of Goods Convention itself recognizes this rule.' 178

Similarly, in

Magellan,the court identified itself as in a position of "first impression"
because no U.S. court had specified pleading requirements for breach of
contract claims under the CISG. 179 In analyzing this issue of "first
impression," the court made no reference to decisions of other national
tribunals that may have been on point or even whether an attempt to
locate such decisions was made. 180
Possibly it is just too much to ask judges to ignore their domestic
understandings in order to facilitate uniform interpretation of the
CISG.18 1 A number of commentators, however, have held out hope
that the goal of uniform interpretation is still attainable. There are a
number of different suggestions on how that goal can be reached.
One theory suggests that the CISG itself provides ample
guidance for its own interpretation. Professor Hillman offers that the
CISG not only provides specific rules to govern international trade,

175.
Hartnell, supra note 165, at 6 (arguing that the Convention's success
depends upon its development as a predictable instrument).
176.
Delchi Carrier S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (2d Cir.
1995). See also Murray, Neglect, supra note 167, at 369-71. The United States is not
the only nation guilty of using a domestic interpretive perspective rather than
autonomous interpretation. An Italian court interpreted Article 79 of the CISG in light
of its domestic understanding of performance. Id. at 371.
177.
Delchi Carrier,71 F.3d at 1028.
178.
Filanto, S.p.A- v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1240 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
179.
Magellan Intl Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19386, *15 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 7, 1999).
180. Id.
181.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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but it also contains general principles, derived from the rules and
82
organized into a coherent framework.1
Hilhnan's first principle is that the CISG is designed to ensure
"the enforcement of the parties' intentions."183 According to Hillman,
the drafters had a "respect for individual freedom, including the right
to employ one's economic resources." 18 4 He finds support for this
principle in Articles 11, 29, and 8, as well as in Article 19(2), which,
by partially abrogating the mirror image rule in the battle of the
forms, allows for the parties' intentions in contract formation to
remain where different or additional terms are immaterial18'
A second principle that Hillman extracts from the CISG is that it
was designed to help "parties realize the fruits of their exchange by
avoiding disputes," suggesting that "[a] party who enters an
international sales contract expects cooperation and reasonable
conduct by its counterpart...." 8 6 He again finds that Article 19(2)
specifically supports this goal by requiring the offeror to object to
immaterial discrepancies in order to prevent them from becoming
part of the contract, thus balancing the notice requirement with the
87
reasonableness, or materiality, of the offeree's terms.'
A third principle within the CISG is a commitment to keep a
deal together, even in the face of problems that surface between the
parties.188 Article 19(2), by requiring affirmative objection to
immaterial terms, "encourage[s] or require[s] communication between

182.
Robert A. Hillman, Applying the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the InternationalSale of Goods: The Elusive Goal of Uniformity, in REVIEW OF THE
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GoODs 21, 26( 1995).

183.
Id. at 27. This principle can be gleaned from Article 6, which allows parties
to contract out of the CISG altogether. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. To
Hillman, the language of Article 6 shows the respect of the CISG for freedom of
contract over regulation of private behavior. Hillman, supra note 182, at 27.
184. Id. For a discussion of this right as a respect for individual freedom, see
John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure1, 20 N.C. L. REV. 237 (1942).
185. Hillman, supranote 182, at 27. Article 11 provides that "[a] contract of sale
need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other
requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses."
HONNOLD, supra note 7, at 135. Article 29(1) states that "[a) contract may be modified
or terminated by the mere agreement of the parties." Id. at 229. Article 8(1) says that
"statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his
intent where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent
was." Id. at 115. Hillman's reliance on Article 19(2) to make a substantive difference
to parties is controversial. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (arguing that the
practical effect of 19(2) is to do little to minimize the harshness of 19(l)s mirror image
requirement).
186. Hillman, supra note 182, at 27-28. See also C.M. BLANCA & M.J. BO,,TAJ,
COMEENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 80-81 (1987).
187. Hillman, supra note 182, at 28 n.77. Hillman argues that "[tihe duty to act
reasonably may be the Convention's most pervasive general principle." Id. at 28. To
support this, he cites to numerous Articles of the CISG, including 60(a), 30.34, 32(3),
18(2), 39(1), 47(1), 63(1), 65(1), 16(2)(b), 29(2), and 47(2). Id. at 28-30 nn.69.93.
188. Id. at 27.
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the parties to resolve problems before a total contract breakdown." 18 9
Hillman also finds that the inadequate remedies for contract breach
offered by the CISG in Articles 77 and 86 encourage parties to
"complete their deals rather than rely on the Convention's legal
apparatus to make them whole." 190
Under this theory, judges should look to these systematic
principles rather than their own domestic understandings in
adjudicating difficult legal issues like the battle of the forms. 19 1 In
deciding whether an additional or different boilerplate clause is
"material," the judge presumably should be guided by the
commitment of the CISG to the intent of the parties, the avoidance of
192
disputes, and contractual obligation.
The authenticity of these principles seems questionable in the
battle of the forms, where Article 19(1) commits the CISG to an
approach that is expected to result in fewer enforceable contracts
than other approaches. 93 Hillman's principles, at least in this
particular setting, seem contrary to what has been the overwhelming
interpretation of Article 19: a choice by the CISG drafters to embrace
194
the mirror image rule in spite of its harshness to business reality.
Moreover, even if one were to accept these principles as indeed
implicit in Article 19 and other parts of the CISG, they face two
additional obstacles.
First, the controversy over their verity
illustrates that, even if true, they are hardly self-evident. This
suggests that litigants will risk the same aberrant interpretation

189.
190.

Id. at 30.
Id. at 32. Article 77 provides:

[a] party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are
reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit,
resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in
breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss
should have been mitigated.
HONNOLD, supra note 7, at 456. Others have understood this section only as a
reflection of the common law "duty to mitigate," and not a remedy that is somehow
inadequate for the aggrieved party. Id. Article 86(1) states, "[i]f the buyer has received
the goods and intends to exercise any right under the contract or this Convention to
reject them, he must take such steps to preserve them as are reasonable in the
circumstances." Id. at 523. Hillman also finds a fourth principle-the CISG's
commitment to make aggrieved parties whole-that is not included in the main
discussion because it is not derived from the Article 19 battle of the forms provision.
Hillman, supranote 182, at 32-33.
191.
Hillman, supra note 182, at 37. Hillman argues that recognition of these
principles will lead judges to develop a "systematic methodology" for autonomous
interpretation of the CISG. Id. He adds that the use of case law will help only if
judges are first guided by these principles. Id. Otherwise, conflicting case law will
develop based on domestic perspectives that will harm the goal of uniformity. Id. See
also BIANcA & BONELL, supra note 186, at 90-92; HONNOLD, supra note 7, at 142-45.
192.
Hillman, supranote 182, at 21.
193.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
194.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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problems found in interpretations of the rules themselves.'93 Second,
because they are not self-evident, any success in adopting them will
require some kind of uniform dissemination. 196 Hillman answers
these objections by arguing that adherence to the four corners of the
CISG document for interpretive guidance is less risky than the
interpretation that the CISG is currently receiving through the
197
development of an international body of case law.
Although Hilhnan's theory downplays the role of case law
development as a means for uniform interpretation of the CISG, there
are others who suggest that the development of international case
law is necessary to satisfy the Article 7 requirement of autonomous
interpretation. 9 8 As important as this is, U.S. development of CISG
case law in the United States graphically illustrates the need for
supplemental mechanisms to promote uniform international
jurisprudence. 199

195.
Sunil R. Harjani, The Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of
Goods in United States Courts, 23 HOUS. J. IN'L L 49, 60 (2000) (noting that
"[c]ommentators vary greatly on their understanding of [the purposes inherent in the
CISG] and provide different solutions to promote uniformity and international
character.").
196.
See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text (discussing the efforts by
UNCITRAL and others at uniform dissemination).
197.
Hillman, supra note 182, at 38. If the U.S. experience is indicative of the
risks associated with the development of case law absent grounding principles,
Hillman's assessment of those risks is accurate. See supra notes 176-81 and
accompanying text.
198.
See Hartnell, supra note 165, at 46. Professor Hartnell argues that the
Articles of the CISG that pertain to its scope (such as Article 4(a)'s rejection of a
validity requirement for Convention applicability) should be developed on a case-bycase basis that incorporates concepts of public policy and the development of
international jurisprudence. Id. She argues, however, that validity can only be
understood in light of domestic views of contract, which places Article 4(a) in conflict
with Article 7's requirement of autonomous interpretation. Id. at 49. Others argue
that all parts of the CISG are subject to the Article 7 requirement and should be
interpreted "teleologically;," that is, in accordance with its purpose of international
unification of commercial law. Peter Schlechtriem, Unification of the Law for the
InternationalSale of Goods, in XIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LW
(GERiAN NATIONAL REPORT) 141 (1987). Under this contrary view, all parts of the

CISG should be interpreted independent from all national laws. Id. at 128.
199.
Sturley, supra note 166, at 800-01 (discussing generally the constraints of
domestic law upon international law uniformity). Professor Sturley argues that the
wide variety of domestic constraints upon courts drive them into conflicting
interpretations of international uniform law. Id. at 800. He suggests a number of
steps to address this problem, including recognizing among international legal scholars
the impact of domestic law upon interpretation of international uniform law.
considering measures to reduce the influence of domestic law, increasing awareness
among national courts as to the dangers of interpreting uniform laws in accordance
with domestic doctrine, and developing institutional measures to avoid conflicts m the
interpretation of uniform law. Id. at 800-01. The institutional measures could include
better choice of law rules, increased availability of international case law (such as that
attempted by UNCITRAL), and even the creation of international tribunals to ensure
separation from domestic influence. Id. at 801. For a discussion of the wide variety of
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One possible mechanism is the adoption of official CISG
comments to aid judges in applying the CISG with international
consistency. It has been suggested that such comments could offer
interpretive guidance as well as illustrations for each article of the
CISG. 200 One commentator has offered the U.S. experience with UCC
comments as a guide to the development of CISG comments. 20 1 He
notes that the success of the UCC can be attributed to the statements
of purpose in its commentary that were, in fact, Karl Llewellyn's
solution to the need for uniform interpretation.2 0 2 He argues that the
introduction of official comments into the CISG
. . . could be the catalyst in educating bench and bar throughout the
world in pursuit of the elusive goal of autonomous interpretation and
construction of the Convention. They could eliminate manufactured
difficulties and become a major force in promoting familiarity and use
of the Convention through a reasoned analysis of the purpose of each
Article, in pursuit of the general purposes and policies of the entire
203
Convention.

Official CISG comments could provide international canons of
statutory interpretation that would cut through the multitude of
differing domestic standards. 20 4 Since courts in the United States are
familiar with the role of official comments in a code, the addition of
such comments to the CISG would at least help American judges to
look beyond their own borders and perhaps avoid the kind of
20 5
damaging results seen in the cases described above.
It is possible that official CISG comments would embrace and
codify the principles that Professor Hillman finds inherent in the
existing text of the CISG. If this happens, the codification of these
principles would overcome the problems of apparentness and
dissemination under which Hillman's theory currently struggles.
Perhaps such comments would clarify whether Article 19 is intended
to require a complete, mirrored acceptance to form an enforceable

political issues associated with the establishment of international adjudicative
tribunals, see Anthony DePalma, Nafta's Powerful Little Secret: Obscure Tribunals
Settle Disputes, But Go Too Far, CriticsSay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at BUl.
200. Murray, Neglect, supra note 167, at 375.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 376. For additional discussion of the role of comments in the UCC,
see Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 597. See also Alces & Frisch, supranote 52.
203. Murray, Neglect, supra note 167, at 378-79.
204.
Sturley, supra note 166, at 744-45 (discussing how domestic canons
constrain U.S. courts but also acknowledging that domestic laws will make interpretive
conflicts inevitable in the absence of "stronger considerations of international
uniformity.").
205.
Cook, supra note 142, at 200. See also Paul Lansing, The Change in
American Attitude to the International Unification of Sales Law Movement and
UNCITRAL, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 269, 272 (1980) (discussing the role that the UCC had in
changing American willingness toward favoring international uniformity).
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contract or whether, as Hillman's minority position suggests, it is
intended to reflect the realities of real-world contracting.
C. The Need for a More Educated Bar
A third obstacle to harmonization of the CISG with the domestic
laws of the United States and Canada is the lack of familiarity with
the CISG among the practicing bar. Many of the same problems
highlighted in the discussion about the need for uniform
interpretation stem from this lack of familiarity. 20 6 Even though it
was ratified by the United States more than twelve years ago, only a

handful of federal court decisions have substantively interpreted the
CISG, with only two addressing the battle of the forms. 20 7 This
paucity of case law suggests that lawyers and judges in the United
States do not know about the CISG, even though it potentially
governs hundreds of billions of dollars worth of U.S. trade.2018
This ignorance has been anecdotally confirmed by a recent
survey of the Florida Bar. 209 Although most law school faculty in
Florida indicated familiarity with the CISG, they also noted that the
CISG was not being taught in contracts or sales courses. 2 10 The
response of practitioners was particularly disturbing. The survey
found that an astonishing thirty percent of the members of the
Florida Bar Section on International Law indicated reasonable

206. Murray, Neglect, supra note 167, at 371 (expressing concern that lack of
familiarity with the CISG is causing lawyers to avoid it out of fear).
207.
See, eg., MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova d'Agostino,
S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding the parol evidence rule inapplicable
under the CISG); Delchi Carrier S.pA. v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995)
(determining damages available under the CISG for nonconforming goods); Viva Vino
Import Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.L, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12347 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(holding that CISG did not apply because agreements were not for a specific sale of
goods); Magellan Int'l Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 1999 U.S. Dist. LFXIS 19386
(holding that plaintiff properly alleged a cause of action under the CISG to withstand a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Medical Marketing Int'l, Inc. v. Internzionale Medico Scientifica,
S.R.L, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7380 (E.D. La. 1999) (interpreting the CISG's public
laws and regulations provision); Mitchell Aircraft Spares, Inc. v. European Aircraft
Serv. AB, 23 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. IM. 1998) (following the MCC-Marbleparol evidence
finding); Calzturificio Claudia s.n.c. v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4586 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that the CISG does not contain a statute of frauds or a
parol evidence rule); Helen Kaminski Pty. Ltd. v. Marketing Australian Prods.. Inc.,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10630 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the CISG's scope does not
include distributorship agreements); Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewdch Inel Corp., 789 F.
Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (interpreting a battle of the forms under the CISG).
208. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
209. Michael Wallace Gordon, Some Thoughts on the Rcceptiteness of Contract
Rules in the CISG and UNIDROIT Principles as Reflected In One State's (Florida)
Experience of (1) Law School Faculty, (2) Members of the Bar With An International
Practice,and (3) Judges, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 361 (1998).
210. Id. at 364-65.
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knowledge of the CISG.21 Further, only fifteen percent drafted a
provision in a contract that described the applicability of the CISG. 2 12
The survey received a similar response from Florida judges, and
noted that there are no reported cases in Florida that involve the
213
CISG.
The Canadian experience has been substantially similar. Even
though the CISG has been the law in Canada since 1992, the first
reported decision involving the CISG did not come down until
2 14
December 1998, ending almost seven years of silence on the issue.
One commentator has said, "ilt is safe to assume that the level of
consciousness about the Convention is very low among commercial
lawyers in Canada....
The ignorance of Canadian and U.S. lawyers toward the CISG is
illustrated by GPL Treatment, Ltd. v. Louisiana-Pacific
Corporation.2 16 That case involved an oral purchase agreement
followed by a written confirmation form. 2 17 When the agreement
broke down, GPL Treatment, a small business in Canada, sued the
U.S.-based Louisiana-Pacific Corporation for breach of contract.2 18
Louisiana-Pacific defended by claiming that the agreement failed
under the UCC's statute of frauds provision. 219 GPL asserted that
the agreement did not violate the statute of frauds under an
exception to the UCC rule. 220 GPL also belatedly tried to argue that

the CISG rather than the UCC governed this dispute, but it raised
this issue too late and the trial judge refused to hear that
argument. 221 GPL narrowly won the case under the UCC, but this
would have been a much easier case had GPL properly raised the
222
applicability of the CISG.

Unquestionably, CISG should have been the governing law over
this dispute, as the parties were from different countries that had

223
both ratified the CISG; neither party had opted out of the CISG.

Had it been used, GPL would have never had to argue through a
statute of frauds claim because the CISG specifically rejects a statute

211.
Id. at 368.
212.
Id.
213.
Id. at 369.
214.
Ziegel, FirstDecision, supra note 71, at 313. That case was Nova Tool &
Mold Inc. v. London Industries, Inc., [1998] 84 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1089 (Can.) (only
mentioning the CISG in a short passage and not giving a view as to its applicability).
215.
Ziegel, First Decision, supra note 71, at 318.

216.
1995).
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

GPL Treatment v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 894 P.2d 470 (Or. Ct. App.
Id. at 471.
Id.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 477 n.4.
Dodge, supra note 51, at 75.
See supra note 8 (providing Article 1 applicability of the CISG).
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of frauds requirement.224 The plaintiffs tardy submission of an issue
of such magnitude as the applicable governing law illustrates the
ignorance of the bar with respect to the CISG. It also shows the risks
associated with that ignorance, and stands "as a stark warning that
all practitioners whose practice encompasses commercial matters
should be familiar with the Convention. '' 225 One commentator has
noted, "[tihe plaintiffs gave up an argument that was a sure winner
and were forced to rely instead on [the UCC], which presented a
much closer question ... and cost the plaintiffs a good deal more in
226
attorney's fees."
The solution to this problem of ignorance rests in educating and
informing American and Canadian lawyers. It has been argued that
this needs to start in first-year contracts courses. 227 Doing so will
allow students to compare and contrast the varied approaches taken
by the UCC, the common law, and the CISG to such problems as the
battle of the forms. 22 8 The development of these comparative skills
will serve students well as they later have to choose among these
approaches in the chance that they find themselves drafting or
litigating over choice of law provisions in international contracts. In
order to facilitate exposure to students, contracts professors need to
be informed about the CISG and casebooks need to incorporate it into
229
the covered materials.
Education through first-year contracts courses will have a delayed
effect as students matriculate into the practicing bar. For this reason,
30
efforts must be increased to educate at the practitioner level.?
Although it has been noted that programs such as continuing legal
education (CLE) courses have made efforts to educate the bar to the
CISG, the record as discussed above begs for additional resources.2 1
It may be that informed practitioners will choose to opt out of the
CISG through Article 6 and be governed by the domestic laws with
which they are more familiar.2 32 It may even be that, with time, one
of the outlined approaches to the battle of the forms will prove to be
3
the dominant choice among parties to international contracts.2

224.
Dodge, supranote 51, at 75.
225.
Fletchner, supra note 11, at 131.
226.
Dodge, supra note 51, at 75.
227.
Id. at 77-78. See also Gordon, supra note 209, at 371 (urging that 'every
student ought to be 'red-flagged' about the CISG in the required contracts class.").
Professor Gordon also indicates that he would be concerned about the quality of his
education if he went through law school without knowing about the CISG. Id.
228.
Dodge, supra note 51, at 73.
229.
Id. at 77.
230.
Fletchner, supranote 11, at 138.
231.
Gordon, supra note 209, at 362 n.4.
232.
Ziegel, FirstDecision, supra note 71, at 318; see also Dodge, supra note 51,
at 79.
233.
For a rare American argument that the mirror image rule is superior to the
UCC approach, see Baird & Weisberg, supra note 44, at 1251-62. Baird and Weisberg
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Whatever the future holds for the battle of the forms, it is imperative
to international harmonization that lawyers become educated about
the CISG if only so that its effectiveness can be measured against
23 4
those offered by domestic laws.

IV. CONCLUSION
The battle of the forms is an area of commercial law whose
solutions remain unsettled. The United States relies predominantly
on the UCC approach, looking to the intent of the parties and finding
agreement even though the parties have not indicated complete
assent. Canadian domestic law is based largely on the common law
mirror image rule, which requires complete assent to all aspects of a
contract in order to find agreement. The CISG adopts an approach to
the battle of the forms that embraces the mirror image rule, but
attempts to soften it through an allowance for non-material terms to
become part of a contract.
The differences in approach to the battle of the forms must be
reconciled to facilitate harmonization of commercial law between the
United States and Canada. The CISG can be that vehicle for
harmonization as the already extant law of both countries. There are
a number of challenges, however. Paramount among these is the
need for vertical uniformity. Vertical uniformity would facilitate
harmonization by ensuring that the varied approaches are

argue that the mirror image rule allows parties to tailor boilerplate terms to suit their
own needs, while the UCC standards-based approach allows a court to supply UCC
gap-fillers that may not suit either of the parties' interests. Id. at 1251. They also
argue that the harshness of the mirror image rule could be mitigated through the
adoption of a de minimis approach to prevent parties from escaping obligations where a
different or additional contract term makes no difference to the substance of the deal.
Id. at 1252-53. This problem of escaping contracts through meaningless boilerplate
provisions is not an issue with which courts are often forced to deal. Id. at 1253. This
is due to the fact that such conduct usually occurs in industries with high price
fluctuation, like commodity exchanges, while most battle of the forms situations arise
in a manufacturing context. Id. Finally, they argue that
commercial law works best when it makes it easy for merchants to design the
contract terms suited to their needs and when it assures them that the terms
they draft will prove binding. Formal rules, we believe, despite their poor
repute in the judicial history of commercial law, may achieve these goals far
better than the conventional wisdom has recognized.
Id. at 1262.
234.
It has been suggested, however, that education as a solution to ignorance
among the bar "is only part of the remedy; time may prove to be the other as more
decisions applying CISG are published and courts develop a method of interpretation
that takes into account the international context of CISG and produces predictable
results within acceptable degrees of variation." V. Susanne Cook, CISG: From the
Perspectiveof the Practitioner,17 J.L. & COM. 343, 351 (1998).
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Isis)

assimilated into a uniform approach to the battle of the forms, both
domestically and between nations.
There must be other efforts aimed at harmonization because of
the continued popularity of the UCC in the United States. One such
effort is to increase uniformity of interpretation of the CISG through
the availability of international case law, the development of CISG
comments, and the effort to find purposive principles within the CISG
document itself. Another effort is to educate the bar, both
domestically and abroad in such a way as to ensure use of the CISG.
Although the CISG has struggled in its early life as an international
commercial code, there is hope that, through such efforts, it will be
the vehicle for harmonization that was envisioned by its founders.
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